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Abstract. The existence of errors or inconsistencies in
the configuration of security components, such as filtering
routers and/or firewalls, may lead to weak access control
policies — potentially easy to be evaded by unauthorized
parties. We present in this paper a proposal to create, man-
age, and deploy consistent policies in those components
in an efficient way. To do so, we combine two main ap-
proaches. The first approach is the use of an aggregation
mechanism that yields consistent configurations or signals
inconsistencies. Through this mechanism we can fold ex-
isting policies of a given system and create a consistent and
global set of access control rules — easy to maintain and
manage by using a single syntax. The second approach
is the use of a refinement mechanism that guarantees the
proper deployment of such a global set of rules into the sys-
tem, yet free of inconsistencies.
1 Introduction
In order to defend the resources of an information system
against unauthorized actions, a security policy must be de-
fined by the administrator of an information system, i.e. a
set of rules stating what is permitted and what is prohib-
ited in a system during normal operations. Once specified
the complete set of prohibitions and permissions, the ad-
ministrator must decide which security mechanisms to use
in order to enforce the security policy. This enforcement
consists in distributing the security rules expressed in this
policy over different security components, such as filtering
routers and firewalls. This implies cohesion of the security
functions supplied by these components. Indeed, security
rules deployed over different components must be consis-
tent, addressing the same decisions under equivalent condi-
tions, and not repeating the same actions more than once.
A first solution to ensure these requirements is by ap-
plying a formal security model to express network security
policies. In [11], for example, an access control language
based on XML syntax and supported by the access control
model Or-BAC [1] is proposed for specifying access control
meta-rules and, then, refined into different firewall configu-
ration rules through XSLT transformations. In [14], another
top-down proposal based on the RBAC model [17] is also
suggested for such a purpose. However, and although the
use of formal models ensures cohesion, completeness and
optimization as built-in properties, in most cases, adminis-
trators are usually reluctant to define a whole security policy
from scratch, and they expect to recycle existing configura-
tions previously deployed over a given system.
A second solution to guarantee consistent and non-
redundant firewall configurations consists in analyzing and
fixing rules already deployed. In [13], for example, a tax-
onomy of conflicts in security policies is presented, and two
main categories are proposed: (1) intra-firewall anomalies,
which refer to those conflicts that might exist within the lo-
cal set of rules of a given firewall; (2) inter-firewall anoma-
lies, which refer to those conflicts that might exist between
the configuration rules of different firewalls that match the
same traffic. The authors in [13] propose, moreover, an au-
dit mechanism in order to discover and warn about these
anomalies. In [2, 3], we pointed out to some existing limi-
tations in [13], and presented an alternative set of anomalies
and audit algorithms that detect, report, and eliminate those
intra- and inter-component inconsistencies existing on dis-
tributed security setups — where both firewalls and NIDSs
are in charge of the network security policy.
The main drawback of the first solution, i.e., refinement
processes such as [11, 14], relies on the necessity of for-
mally writing a global security policy from scratch, as well
as a deep knowledge of a given formal model. This rea-
son might explain why this solution is not yet widely used,
and most of the times policies are simply deployed based
on the expertise and flair of security administrators. The
main drawback of the second solution, i.e., audit processes
such as [13, 2] for analyzing local and distributed security
setups, relies on the lack of knowledge about the deployed
policy from a global point of view — which is very helpful
for maintenance and troubleshooting tasks.
In this paper we propose to combine both solutions to
better guarantee the requirements specified for a given net-
work access control policy. Our procedure consists of two
main steps. In the first step, the complete set of local poli-
cies — already deployed over each firewall of a given sys-
tem — are aggregated, and a global security policy is de-
rived. It is then possible to update, analyze, and redeploy
such a global security policy into several local policies —
yet free of anomalies — in a further second step. We need,
moreover, a previous step for retrieving all those details of
the system’s topology which might be necessary during the
aggregation and deployment processes (cf. Section 2). The
use of automatic network tools, such as [18], may allow
us to automatically generate this information, and properly
manage any change within the system.
The rest of this paper has been organized as follows. We
first present in Section 2 the formalism we use to specify
filtering rules, an the network model we use to represent
the topology of the system. We describe in Section 3 our
mechanisms to aggregate and deploy firewall configuration
rules, and prove the correctness of such mechanisms. We
present some related work in Section 4, and close the paper
in Section 5 with some conclusions and future work.
2 Rules, Topology and Anomalies
We recall in this section some of the definitions previously
introduced in [2, 3]. We first define a filtering rule in the
form Ri : {cndi} → decisioni, where i is the relative posi-
tion of the rule within the set of rules, decisioni is a boolean
expression in {accept, deny}, and {cndi} is a conjunctive
set of condition attributes (protocol, source, destination,
and so on), such that {cndi} equals A1 ∧ A2 ∧ ... ∧ Ap,
and p is the number of condition attributes of a given filter-
ing rule.
We define now a set of functions to determine which fire-
walls of the system are crossed by a given packet know-
ing its source and destination. Let F be a set of fire-
walls and let Z be a set of zones. We assume that each
pair of zones in Z are mutually disjoint, i.e., if zi ∈ Z
and zj ∈ Z then zi ∩ zj = ∅. We define the predicates
connected(f1, f2) (which becomes true whether there ex-
ists, at least, one interface connecting firewall f1 to firewall
f2) and adjacent(f, z) (which becomes true whether the
zone z is interfaced to firewall f ). We then define a set of
paths, P , as follows. If f ∈ F then [f ] ∈ P is an atomic
path. Similarly, if [p.f1] ∈ P (be “.” a concatenation func-
tor) and f2 ∈ F , such that f2 /∈ p and connected(f1, f2),
then [p.f1.f2] ∈ P . Let us now define functions first, last,
and tail from P in F such that if p is a path, then first(p)
corresponds to the first firewall in the path, last(p) corre-
sponds to the last firewall in the path, and tail(f, p) corre-
sponds to rest of firewalls in the path after firewall f . We
also define the order functor between paths as p1 ≤ p2, such
that path p1 is shorter than p2, and where all the firewalls
within p1 are also within p2. We define functions route
such that p ∈ route(z1, z2) iff path p connects zone z1 to
zone z2, i.e., p ∈ route(z1, z2) iff adjacent(first(p), z1)
and adjacent(last(p), z2); and minimal route (or MR
for short), such that p ∈ MR(z1, z2) iff the following con-
ditions hold: (1) p ∈ route(z1, z2); (2) there does not exist
p′ ∈ route(z1, z2) such that p′ < p.
Let us finally close this section by overviewing the
complete set of anomalies defined in our previous work
[2, 3]:
Intra-firewall anomalies
• Shadowing – A configuration rule Ri is shadowed in
a set of configuration rules R whether such a rule never
applies because all the packets that Ri may match, are
previously matched by another rule, or combination of
rules, with higher priority.
• Redundancy – A configuration rule Ri is redundant
in a set of configuration rules R whether the following
conditions hold: (1) Ri is not shadowed by any other
rule or set of rules; (2) when removing Ri from R, the
security policy does not change.
Inter-firewall anomalies
• Irrelevance – A configuration rule Ri is irrelevant in
a set of configuration rules R if one of the following
conditions holds: (1) Both source and destination ad-
dress are within the same zone; (2) The firewall is not
within the minimal route that connects the source zone
to the destination zone.
• Full/Partial-redundancy – A redundancy anomaly1
occurs between two firewalls whether the firewall clos-
est to the destination zone blocks (completely or par-
tially) traffic that is already blocked by the first fire-
wall.
• Full/Partial-shadowing – A shadowing anomaly oc-
curs between two firewalls whether the one closest to
the destination zone does not block traffic that is al-
ready blocked by the first firewall.
• Full/Partial-misconnection – A misconnection a-
nomaly occurs between two firewalls whether the clos-
est firewall to the source zone allows all the traffic —
or just a part of it — that is denied by the second one.
1Although this kind of redundancy is sometimes expressly introduced
by network administrators (e.g., to guarantee the forbidden traffic will not
reach the destination), it is important to report it since, if such a rule is
applied, we may conclude that at least one of the redundant components is
wrongly working.
3 Proposed Mechanisms
The objective of our proposal is the following. From a set F
of firewalls initially deployed over a set Z of zones, and if
neither intra- nor inter-firewall anomalies apply over such a
setup, we aim to derive a single global security police setup
R, also free of anomalies. Then, this set of rules R can be
maintained and updated2 as a whole, as well as redeployed
over the system through a further refinement process. We
present in the following the main processes of our proposal.
3.1 Aggregation of Policies
Our aggregation mechanism works as follows. During an
initial step (not covered in this paper) it gathers all those de-
tails of the system’s topology which might be necessary dur-
ing the rest of stages. The use of network tools, such as [18],
allows us to properly manage this information, like the set F
of firewalls, the set of configurations rules f [rules] of each
firewall f ∈ F , the set Z of zones of the system, and some
other topological details defined in Section 2. An analy-
sis of intra-firewall anomalies is then performed within the
first stage of the aggregation process, in order to discover
and fix any possible anomaly within the local configuration
of each firewall f ∈ F . In the next step, an analysis of
inter-firewall anomalies is performed at the same time that
the aggregation of polices into R also does. If an anomaly
within the initial setup is discovered, then an aggregation
error warns the officer and the process quits. Conversely, if
no inter-firewall anomalies are found, then a global set of
rules R is generated and so returned as a result of the whole
aggregation process.
We present in Algorithm 1 our proposed aggregation
process. The input data is a set F of firewalls whose con-
figurations we want to fold into a global set of rules R. For
reasons of clarity, we assume in our algorithm that one can
access the elements of a set as a linked-list through the op-
erator elementi. We also assume one can add new values
to the list as any other normal variable does (elementi ←
value), as well as to both remove and initialize elements
through the addition of an empty set (elementi ← ∅). The
internal order of elements from the linked-list, moreover,
keeps with the relative ordering of elements.
The aggregation process consists of two main phases.
During the first phase (cf. lines 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1), and
through an iterative call to the auxiliary function policy-
rewriting (cf. Algorithm 4), it analyzes the complete set F
of firewalls, in order to discover and remove any possible
intra-firewall anomaly. Thus, after this first stage, no use-
less rules in the local configuration of any firewall f ∈ F
might exist. We refer to Section 3.2 for a more detailed
description of this function.
2These operations are not covered in the paper.
Algorithm 1: aggregation(F )
/*Phase 1*/1
foreach f1 ∈ F do2
policy-rewriting (f1[rules]);3
/*Phase 2*/4
R ← ∅;5
i ← ∅;6
foreach f1 ∈ F do7
foreach r1 ∈ f1[rules] do8
Zs ← {z ∈ Z | z ∩ source (r1) 6= ∅};9
Zd ← {z ∈ Z | z ∩ destination (r1) 6= ∅};10
foreach z1 ∈ Zs do11
foreach z2 ∈ Zd do12
if (z1 = z2) or (f1 /∈ MR(z1, z2)) then13
aggregationError ();14
return ∅;15
else if (r1[decision] =“accept”) then16
foreach f2 ∈ MR(z1, z2) do17
f2rd ← ∅;18
f2rd ← {r2 ∈ f2 | r1 ∽ r2 ∧19
r2[decision] =“deny”};20
if (¬empty(f2rd)) then21
aggregationError ();22
return ∅;23
else24
f2ra ← ∅;25
f2ra ← {r2 ∈ f2 | r1 ∽ r2 ∧26
r2[decision] =“accept”};27
foreach r2 ∈ f2ra do28
Ri ← Ri ∪ r2;29
Ri[source]← z1;30
Ri[destination] ← z2;31
i ← (i+ 1);32
r2 ← ∅;33
else if (f1 =first (MR (z1, z2))) then34
f3r ← ∅;35
foreach f3 ∈ tail(f1, MR(z1, z2)) do36
f3r ← {r3 ∈ f3|r1 ∽ r3} ∪ f3r;37
if (¬empty(f3r)) then38
aggregationError ();39
return ∅;40
else41
Ri ← Ri ∪ r1;42
Ri[source]← z1;43
Ri[destination]← z2;44
i← (i + 1);45
r1 ← ∅;46
else47
aggregationError ();48
return ∅;49
policy-rewriting (R);50
return R;51
During the second phase (cf. lines 5–51 of Algorithm 1),
the aggregation of firewall configurations is performed as
follows. For each permission configured in a firewall f ∈
F , the process folds the whole chain3 of permissions within
the components on the minimal route from the source zone
to the destination zone; and for each prohibition, it directly
keeps such a rule, assuming it becomes to the closest fire-
wall to the source, and no more prohibitions should be
placed on the minimal route from the source zone to the
destination zone. Moreover, and while the aggregation of
policies is being performed, an analysis of inter-firewall
anomalies is also applied in parallel. Then, if any inter-
firewall anomaly is detected during the aggregation of rules
R← aggregation(F ), a message of error is raised and the
process quits.
Let us for example assume that during the aggregation
process, a filtering rule ri ∈ fi[rules] presents an inter-
firewall irrelevance, i.e., ri is a rule that applies to a source
zone z1 and a destination zone z2 (such that s = z1 ∩
source(ri) 6= ∅, d = z2 ∩ destination(ri) 6= ∅) and either
z1 and z2 are the same zone, or firewall fi is not in the path
[f1, f2, ..., fk] ∈ MR(z1, z2). In this case, we can observe
that during the folding process specified by Algorithm 1, the
statement of line 13, i.e., (z1 = z2) or (fi /∈ MR(z1, z2)),
becomes true and, then, the aggregation process finishes
with an error and returns an empty set of rules (cf. state-
ments of lines 14 and 15). Similarly, let us assume that
ri ∈ fi[rules] presents an inter-firewall redundancy, i.e.,
ri is a prohibition that applies to a source zone z1 and a
destination zone z2 (such that s = z1 ∩ source(ri) 6= ∅,
d = z2 ∩ destination(ri) 6= ∅, and [f1, f2, ..., fk] ∈
MR(z1, z2)) and firewall fi is not the first component in
MR(z1, z2). In this case, we can observe that during the
folding process specified by Algorithm 1, the statement of
line 34, i.e., fi = first(MR(z1, z2)), becomes false and,
then, the aggregating process finishes with an error and re-
turns an empty set of rules.
Let us now assume that ri ∈ fi[rules] presents an inter-
firewall shadowing, i.e., ri is a permission that applies to
a source zone z1 and a destination zone z2 such that there
exists an equivalent prohibition rj that belongs to a fire-
wall fj which, in turn, is closer to the source zone z1 in
MR(z1, z2). In this case, we can observe that during the
folding process specified by Algorithm 1, the statement of
line 38 detects that, after a prohibition in the first firewall
of MR(z1, z2), i.e., fj = first(MR(z1, z2)), there is, at
least, a permission ri that correlates the same attributes.
Then, the aggregating process finishes with an error and
returns an empty set of rules. Let us finally assume that
ri ∈ fi[rules] presents an inter-firewall misconnection, i.e.,
3The operator “∽” is used within Algorithm 1 to denote that two rules
ri and rj are correlated if every attribute in ri has a non empty intersection
with the corresponding attribute in rj .
ri is a prohibition that applies to a source zone z1 and a des-
tination zone z2 such that there exists, at least, a permission
rj that belongs to a firewall fj closer to the source zone z1
in MR(z1, z2). In this case, we can observe that during the
folding process specified by Algorithm 1, the statement of
line 21 detects this anomaly and, then, the process finishes
with an error and returns an empty set of rules.
It is straightforward then to conclude that whether no
inter-firewall anomalies apply to any firewall f ∈ F , our
aggregation process returns a global set of filtering rules R
with the union of all the filtering rules previously deployed
over F . It is yet necessary to perform a post-process of
R, in order to avoid the redundancy of all permissions, i.e.,
accept rules, gathered during the aggregating process. In
order to do so, the aggregation process calls at the end of
the second phase (cf. line 50 of Algorithm 1) to the auxil-
iary function policy-rewriting (cf. Algorithm 4). We offer
in the following a more detailed description of this function.
3.2 Policy Rewriting
We recall in this section our audit process to discover and
remove rules that never apply or are redundant in local fire-
wall policies [9, 10]. The process is based on the analysis
of relationships between the set of configuration rules of a
local policy. Through a rewriting of rules, it derives from an
initial set R to an equivalent one Tr(R) completely free of
dependencies between attributes, i.e., without either redun-
dant or shadowed rules. The whole process is split in three
main functions (cf. algorithms 2, 3 and 4).
The first function, exclusion (cf. Algorithm 2), is an
auxiliary process which performs the exclusion of attributes
between two rules. It receives as input two rules, A
and B, and returns a third rule, C, whose set of con-
dition attributes is the exclusion of the set of conditions
from A over B. We represent the attributes of each rule
in the form of Rule[cnd]4 as a boolean expression over
p possible attributes (such as source, destination, proto-
col, ports, and so on). Similarly, we represent the deci-
sion of the rule in the form Rule[decision] as a boolean
variable whose values are in {accept, deny}. Moreover,
we use two extra elements for each rule, in the form
Rule[shadowing] and Rule[redundancy], as two boolean
variables in {true, false} to store the reason for why a rule
may disappear during the process.
The second function, testRedundancy (cf. Algo-
rithm 3), is a boolean function in {true, false} which,
in turn, applies the transformation exclusion (cf. Algo-
rithm 2) over a set of configuration rules to check whether
the first rule is redundant, i.e., applies the same policy, re-
garding the rest of rules.
4We use the notation Ai and Bi as an abbreviation of both A[cnd][i]
and B[cnd][i] during the statements of lines 6–12.
Finally, the third function, policy-rewriting (cf. Algo-
rithm 4), performs the whole process of detecting and re-
moving the complete set of intra-firewall anomalies. It re-
ceives as input a set R of rules, and performs the audit pro-
cess in two different phases.
Algorithm 2: exclusion(B,A)
C[cnd]← ∅;1
C[decision]← B[decision];2
C[shadowing]← false;3
C[redundancy]← false;4
forall the elements of A[cnd] and B[cnd] do5
if ((A1 ∩B1) 6= ∅ and (A2 ∩B2) 6= ∅ and ... and6
(Ap ∩Bp) 6= ∅) then
C[cnd]← C[cnd] ∪7
{(B1 − A1) ∧ B2 ∧ ... ∧Bp ,8
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ (B2 −A2) ∧ ... ∧ Bp,9
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ (A2 ∩ B2) ∧ (B3 −A3) ∧ ... ∧ Bp,10
...11
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ ... ∧ (Ap−1 ∩Bp−1) ∧ (Bp −Ap)};12
else13
C[cnd]← (C[cnd] ∪B[cnd]);14
return C;15
Algorithm 3: testRedundancy(R,r)
i← 1;1
temp← r;2
while ¬test and (i ≤ count(R)) do3
temp← exclusion(temp,Ri);4
if temp[cnd] = ∅ then5
return true;6
i← (i+ 1);7
return false;8
During the first phase, any possible shadowing between
rules with different decision values is marked and removed
by iteratively applying function exclusion (cf. Algo-
rithm 2). The resulting set of rules obtained after the ex-
ecution of the first phase is again analyzed when applying
the second phase.
Each rule is first analyzed, through a call to function
testRedundancy (cf. Algorithm 3), to those rules written
after the checked rule but that can apply the same decision
to the same traffic. If such a test of redundancy becomes
true, the rule is marked as redundant and then removed.
Otherwise, its attributes are then excluded from the rest of
equivalent rules but with less priority in the order. In this
way, if any shadowing between rules with the same deci-
sion remained undetected during the first phase, it is then
marked and removed.
Algorithm 4: policy-rewriting(R)
n← count(R);1
/*Phase 1*/2
for i← 1 to (n− 1) do3
for j ← (i+ 1) to n do4
if Ri[decision] 6= Rj [decision] then5
Rj ← exclusion (Rj ,Ri);6
if Rj [cnd] = ∅ then7
Rj [shadowing]← true;8
/*Phase 2*/9
for i← 1 to (n− 1) do10
Ra ← {rk ∈ R | n ≥ k > i and11
rk[decision] = ri[decision]};12
if testRedundancy (Ra,Ri) then13
Ri[cnd]← ∅;14
Ri[redundancy]← true;15
else16
for j ← (i+ 1) to n do17
if Ri[decision]=Rj[decision] then18
Rj ←exclusion (Rj ,Ri);19
if (¬Rj [redundancy] and20
Rj [cnd] = ∅) then21
Rj [shadowing]← true;22
Based on the processes defined in algorithms 2, 3, and 4,
we can prove5 the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 4 to R. Then the following statements hold: (1)
R and Tr(R) are equivalent; (2) Ordering the rules in
Tr(R) is no longer relevant; (3) Tr(R) is free from both
shadowing and redundancy.
3.3 Deployment of Rules
We finally present in Algorithm 5 our proposed refinement
mechanism for the deployment of an updated global set of
rules. The deployment strategy defined in the algorithm is
the following. Let F be the set of firewalls that partitions
the system into the set Z of zones. Let R be the set of con-
figuration rules resulting from the maintenance of a given
global set of rules obtained from the aggregation process
presented in Section 3.1 (cf. Algorithm 1). Let r ∈ R be
a configuration rule that applies to a source zone z1 and a
5A set of proofs to validate Theorem 1, as well as a complexity analysis
of function policy-rewriting (cf. Algorithm 4) and its performance in a
research prototype, is provided in [9].
destination zone z2, such that s = z1 ∩ source(r) 6= ∅ and
d = z2∩destination(r) 6= ∅. Let r′ be a rule identical to r
except that source(r′) = s and destination(r′) = d. Let
us finally assume that [f1, f2, . . . , fk] ∈MR(z1, z2). Then,
any rule r ∈ R is deployed over the system as follows:
• If r[decision] = accept then deploy a permission r′
on every firewall on the minimal route from source s
to destination d.
• If r[decision] = deny then deploy a single6 prohibi-
tion r′ on the most-upstream firewall (i.e., the closest
firewall to the source) of the minimal route from source
s to destination d. If such a firewall does not exist, then
generate a deployment error message.
Algorithm 5: deployment(R,Z)
policy-rewriting (R);1
foreach r1 ∈ R do2
Zs ← {z ∈ Z | z ∩ source (r1) 6= ∅};3
Zd ← {z ∈ Z | z ∩ destination (r1) 6= ∅};4
foreach z1 ∈ Zs do5
foreach z2 ∈ Zd do6
if r1[decision] =“accept” then7
foreach f1 ∈ MR(z1, z2) do8
r′1 ← r;9
r′1[source]← Z1;10
r′1[destination]← Z2;11
f1[rules]← f1[rules] ∪ r′;12
else if r1[decision] =“deny” then13
f1 ← first(MR(z1, z2));14
if (¬empty (f1)) then15
r′1 ← r;16
r′1[source]← Z1;17
r′1[destination]← Z2;18
f1[rules]← f1[rules] ∪ r′;19
else20
deploymentError ();21
exit ();22
It is straightforward now to prove that the deployment of
a given set of rules R through Algorithm 5 is free of either
intra- and/or inter-firewall anomalies (cf. Section 2). On the
one hand, during the earliest stage of Algorithm 5, the com-
plete set of rules in R is analyzed and, if necessary, fixed
with our policy-rewriting process (cf. Section 3.2, Algo-
rithm 4). Then, by Theorem 1, we can guarantee that nei-
ther shadowed nor redundant rules might exist in R. More-
over, it also allows us to guarantee that the order between
6This decision is a choice for avoiding inter-firewall redundancy in the
resulting setup.
rules in R is not relevant. On the other hand, the use of
the deployment strategy defined above allows us to guaran-
tee that the resulting setup is free of inter-firewall anoma-
lies. First, since each permission ra in R opens a flow of
permissions over all the firewalls within the minimal routes
from the source to the destination pointed by ra, and since
any other rule r′ in R cannot match the same traffic that ra
matches, we can guarantee that neither inter-firewall shad-
owing nor inter-firewall misconnection can appear in the
resulting setup. Second, since each prohibition rd in R
is deployed just once in the closest firewall to the source
pointed by rd, and since any other rule r′ in R cannot match
the same traffic that rd matches, we can guarantee that any
inter-firewall redundancy can appear in the resulting setup.
4 Related Work
A first solution to deploy access control policies free of
errors is by applying a refinement mechanism. Hence,
following such a top-down mechanism, one can deploy a
global security policy into several component’s configura-
tions [11, 6, 14].
In [11], for example, a formal approach based on the Or-
BAC model [1] is presented for this purpose. There, a set of
filtering rules, whose syntax is specific to a given firewall,
may be generated using a transformation process. The au-
thors in [6], on the other hand, use the concept of roles to de-
fine network capabilities and refinement of policies. Indeed,
they propose the use of an inheritance mechanism through a
hierarchy of entities to automatically generate permissions.
However, their work does not fix, from our point of view,
clear semantics, and their concept of role becomes ambigu-
ous as we pointed out in [11]. Another work based on policy
refinement is the RBNS model [14]. However, and although
the authors claim that their work is based on the RBAC
model [17], it seems that they only keep from this model
only the concept of role. Indeed, the specification of net-
work entities and role and permission assignments are not
rigorous and does not fit any reality [11].
The use of these refinement proposals [11, 6, 14] ensures
cohesion, completeness and optimization as built-in proper-
ties. However, it is not always enough to ensure that the
firewall configuration is completely free of errors and, of-
ten, administrators are reluctant to follow such a proposal.
For this reason, we extended in this paper the approach pre-
sented in [11], offering to administrators the possibility of
aggregating existing configurations before moving to such
a refinement approach.
Support tools, on the other hand, are intended to di-
rectly assist administrators in their task of configuring from
scratch firewall configurations. Firewall Builder [15], for
example, provides a user interface to be used to specify a
network access control policy and then this policy is auto-
matically translated into various firewall configuration lan-
guages such as NetFilter [19], IpFilter [16] or Cisco PIX
[8]. It also provides higher portability. For instance, if in a
given network infrastructure, IpFilter is replaced by NetFil-
ter, it will not be necessary to completely reconfigure Net-
Filter. Firewall Builder will automatically generate the rules
necessary to configure this firewall.
However, we observed some problems when using Fi-
werall Builder. First, we noticed that it might generate in-
correct rules. In the case of NetFilter, for example, we ex-
perienced the generation of rules associated to FORWARD
when they should be associated to OUTPUT and INPUT
chains. Second, we noticed the generation of redundant
rules, although such redundancy was not specified within
the policy. Third, it includes a mechanism called shadowing
to detect redundancy in the policy. However, this shadow-
ing mechanism only detects simple redundancy that corre-
sponds to trivial equality or inclusion between zones. More
complex redundancies (as the anomalies defined in Sec-
tion 2) are unfortunately not detected.
Some other proposals, such as [13, 20, 2, 3], provide
means to directly manage the discovery of anomalies from
a bottom-up approach. For instance, the authors in [13] pro-
pose a set of algorithms to detect policy anomalies in both
single- and multi-firewall configuration setups. In addition
to the discovery process, their approach also attempts an
optimal insertion of arbitrary rules into an existing config-
uration, through a tree based representation of the filtering
criteria. Nonetheless, we consider their approach as incom-
plete. Their discovery approach is not complete since, given
a single- or multiple-component security policy, their de-
tection algorithms are based on the analysis of relationships
between rules two by two. This way, errors due to the union
of rules are not explicitly considered (as our approach pre-
sented in [2, 3] does).
Although in [4] the authors pointed out to this problem-
atic, claiming that they break down the initial set of rules
into an equivalent set of rules free of overlaps between
rules, no specific algorithms have been provided for solv-
ing it. From our point of view, the proposal presented in
[20] best addresses such a problem, although it also presents
some limitations. For instance, we can easily find situations
where the proposal presented in [20] reports partial redun-
dancies instead of a single full redundancy. Moreover, nei-
ther [13] nor [20] address, as we do in this paper by extend-
ing the approach presented in [2, 11], a folding process for
combining both analysis and refinement strategies.
5 Conclusions
The existence of errors or anomalies in the configuration
of network security components, such as filtering routers
or firewalls, is very likely to degrade the security policy of a
system [12]. This is a serious problem which must be solved
since, if not handled correctly, it can lead to unauthorized
parties to get the control of such a system.
We introduced in Section 1 two main strategies to set
firewall configurations free of errors. The first approach
is to apply a formal security model — such as the formal
model we presented in [11] — to express the security pol-
icy of the access control for the network, and to generate the
specific syntax for each given firewall from this formal pol-
icy — for instance, by using XSLT transformations from
the formal policy to generate specific Netfilter configura-
tion rules [19]. A second approach is to apply an analysis
process of existing configurations, in order to detect con-
figuration errors and to properly eliminate them. In [2, 3],
for instance, we presented an audit process based on this
second strategy to set a distributed security scenario free of
misconfiguration.
We presented in Section 3 how to combine both ap-
proaches in order to better guarantee the requirements spec-
ified for a given network access control policy. Thus, from
an initial bottom-up approach, we can analyze existing con-
figurations already deployed into a given system, in order
to detect and correct potential anomalies or configuration
errors. Once verified those setups, we offer to the adminis-
trator a folding mechanism to aggregate the different con-
figurations into a global security policy to, finally, express
by using a sole formal model, the security policy as a whole.
The security officer can then perform maintenance tasks
over such a single point, and then, unfold the changes into
the existing security components of the system.
As work in progress, we are actually evaluating the im-
plementation of the strategy presented in this paper by com-
bining both the refinement process presented in [11] and
the audit mechanism presented in [2, 3] (both of them im-
plemented through a scripting language as a web service
[7]). Although this first research prototype demonstrates the
effectiveness of our approach, more evaluations should be
done to study the real impact of our proposal for the main-
tenance and deployment of complex production scenarios.
We plan to address these evaluations and discuss the results
in a forthcoming paper.
On the other hand, and as future work, we are currently
studying how to extend our approach in the case where the
security architecture includes not only firewalls but also
IDS/IPS, and IPSec devices. Though there is a real similar-
ity between the parameters of those devices’ rules (as we
partially show in [2, 3] for the analysis of anomalies), more
investigation has to be done in order to extend the approach
presented in this paper. In parallel to this work, we are
also considering to extend our approach to the managing of
stateful policies.
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